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Abstract
We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it
can be employed as the sellers optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller o¤ers
di¤erent price-quality bundles of the product. A consumers preference is private information.
With demarketing, consumers must make a costly e¤ort to purchase and/or utilize the product,
whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the e¤ort so that the consumers purchasing
decision is independent of the cost of e¤ort. Our result suggests that, for small or large e¤ort
costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate e¤ort costs, however,
demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with
high-valuation to make transaction e¤ort. By doing so, the seller can price-discriminate more
e¤ectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can
o¤er special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing
can be optimal even for large costs of e¤ort.
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I. Introduction
Firms often make it inconvenient for consumers to purchase their products. Coupons, for example,
require consumers to bear hassle costs of coupon redemption.1 Setting up factory outlets is another
popular way to price-discriminate. Outlet stores o¤er signicant discounts for consumers who are
willing to travel and bear waiting time.2 In these examples, a common observation is that the
consumers with lower valuation incur additional transaction costs  clipping coupons and traveling
to factory outlet stores. The low-valuation consumers pay a lower price, but they must incur a
transaction cost, which in turn discourages the high-valuation consumers from taking advantage
of discounted prices. The underlying assumption behind this price discrimination mechanism is
that the low-valuation consumers are assumed to have a lower opportunity cost of time for clipping,
waiting and traveling.
Following the previous contributions, this paper also analyzes transaction costs and price dis-
crimination. In our model, however, a costly e¤ort increases the likelihood of transaction, and the
seller can make a transaction e¤ort himself, or let the consumers make such an e¤ort. We refer to
the former strategy as marketingand the latter strategy as demarketing. We demonstrate that
it can be optimal for the seller to engage in demarketing, and in such a case, the seller induces only
the high-valuation consumers to exert a transaction e¤ort, thus decreasing the sales opportunity for
the low-valuation consumers. This result is in stark contrast to the previous studies mentioned
above where only the low-valuation consumers are making a transaction e¤ort.
There are many cases where the seller chooses between marketing and demarketing. For example,
a rm can choose whether or not to have sales associates in a showroom. Sales associates foster
buyer awareness of the rms products, help buyers learn about the products, and convince them
to consider the products. For skill-based products such as complex consumer electronics and
computer software, an expert salesperson often helps consumers to realize how they can utilize a
product. Similarly, the rm may operate help-centers to teach product features to consumers or
o¤er free trials of the products. These are the sellers transaction e¤orts (marketing) to increase
the likelihood of a transaction.
When the seller does not make such e¤orts (demarketing), consumers may have to exert a
cognitive e¤ort to be aware of the product, or an information gathering e¤ort to learn the product
features and functionalities. Some demarketing also include reducing the number of stores, business
hours, and useful features of the product, thus making the buyer incur extra costs for transactions.
Again, to alleviate the friction in a transaction, an e¤ort is made by either the seller or the consumer.
We investigate why a seller discourages buyers from purchasing a product/service, by transferring
transaction costs to them. We adopt a monopoly framework with second-degree price discrimination.
Unlike the traditional setup, in our model, the probability of a transaction rises when a transaction
cost is incurred. Under full information, marketing and demarketing give the same optimal outcome
1See, for example, Narasimhan [1984] and Gerstner and Holthausen [1986].
2See Nocke et al. [2011] for example.
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since the seller can adjust the products price level depending on which party bears the cost of
transaction. When the buyers are privately informed about their valuation (type), the answer is
not straightforward.
To preview our result, with marketing, the seller must exert a transaction e¤ort independent
of the consumer type. With demarketing, however, a transaction e¤ort is made depending on a
consumers type, which involves loss of sales opportunity, but allows the seller to price-discriminate
more e¤ectively. As a result, demarketing can dominate marketing. The key trade-o¤ in our paper
is sales opportunity vs. surplus extraction.
The intuition behind our result is as follows. If the seller engages in marketing, the situation
becomes the standard screening problem. As usual in models of this type, a high-valuation (high-
type) consumer has an incentive to misrepresent her type to reap consumer surplus. To mitigate
such incentive, the optimal product quality for the low-type consumer is distorted downward. With
demarketing, the seller has to compensate consumers for the transaction cost through the products
price. We show that the seller induces only the high-type consumers to make a transaction e¤ort.
Because the low-type consumers are not compensated for transaction e¤orts, the high-type consumers
are discouraged from mimicking the low-type consumers. As a result, a demarketing strategy allows
the seller to recover the distortion in the product quality for the low-type consumers.
We show that the seller particularly prefers demarketing to marketing when the transaction cost
is intermediate because the high-type consumers mimicking incentive diminishes substantially. On
the other hand, for small and large transaction costs, the seller prefers marketing to demarketing.
When the transaction cost is small, the sellers compensation is not attractive enough to signi-
cantly mitigate the high-type consumersmimicking incentive. When the transaction cost is large,
the compensation is so large that the reverse incentive problem becomes an issue  the low-type
consumers have an incentive to mimic the high-type consumers in such a case.
We extend the analysis in two ways. First, we further study the case where the seller can choose
how to allocate a share of transaction cost between himself and consumers, and demonstrate that
our main result is robust to this extension. In particular, when the proportion of the high-type
consumers is large enough, the seller will not allocate any transaction e¤ort to himself.
Second, we consider the case where the seller can choose a more rened strategy by o¤ering
special discounts or deals  the price-quality bundle for the high-type consumers is available only
through an exclusive channel, which requires high-type consumers to make a transaction e¤ort for
the high quality product. For example, some retailers o¤er special deals or sales through e-mails
only when consumers submit a long survey. As mentioned above, under the demarketing strategy,
if the cost of transaction e¤ort is su¢ ciently large, the price-discount for the high-type consumers
must also be large. This induces the low-type consumers to choose the product for the high-type
consumers without making a transaction e¤ort. Such incentive, however, is mitigated by exclusive
channels that require a transaction e¤ort for the high quality product. We show that demarketing
with this exclusive channel strategy dominates marketing for large transaction costs.
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Related Literature Following Kotler and Levy [1971] who rst discussed demarketing activities,
there are several theoretical perspectives to account for demarketing. Narasimhan [1984] and Ger-
stner and Holthausen [1986] study price discriminating demarketing. Transaction costs, such as
an opportunity cost to clip coupons, are deliberately created by rms as a tool for screening con-
sumers.3 When consumers with a high (low) value for the product also have high (low) transaction
costs, o¤ering coupons or making purchasing more di¢ cult can be a protable price discrimination
strategy. This correlation is appropriate when high valuation types have higher incomes, but if
instead high valuation types are just more interested in the product then this assumption need not
hold. To capture this latter case, in our model we assume a consumers valuation of the product is
independent of her cost of transaction e¤ort. In addition, in these studies a product is not directly
di¤erentiated in quality. In our model, the seller o¤ers di¤erent price-quality bundles as a screening
device. Our point in this paper is that a distortion in quality o¤ered can be lessened when the seller
adopts a demarketing strategy.4
There are also papers that investigate a signaling e¤ect of demarketing. Feltovich et al. [2002]
show that high quality senders choose not to send signals when there exists noisy exogenous in-
formation about type. Zhao [2000], Bagwell and Overgaard [2006], Mayzlin and Shin [2011] and
Suzuki [2014] show that a high quality producer can distinguish itself from a low quality producer
by lowering awareness or spending less on advertising. In particular, Miklós-Thal and Zhang [2013]
consider a situation in which sophisticated consumers attribute a products market performance to
product quality and marketing e¤orts as well. In their model, demarketing can improve quality
image ex post by highlighting high quality when sales are good and by mitigating quality concerns
when sales are bad.5 In addition, Gerstner et al. [1993] study demarketing as a di¤erentiation from
rival rms to avoid a price war. There are also papers providing behavioral explanations. For
example, Kopalle and Lehmann [2006] argue that sellers may understate quality deliberately to give
a pleasant surprise to consumers.
The current paper employs second degree price discrimination in the monopoly framework pio-
neered by Mussa and Rosen [1978] and Maskin and Riley [1984]. Using that framework, numerous
papers study situations in which marketing or advertising makes price discrimination more prof-
itable to the seller. The literature includes Lewis and Sappington [1994], Ottaviani and Prat [2001],
Courty and Li [2001], and more recently, Grubb [2009] and Nocke et al. [2011].6 Unlike these
3There are other papers that study a setting where consumers have to incur some costs. Wernerfelt [1994] compares
several di¤erent selling formats when buyers incur transaction costs, and Wernerfelt [1996] considers rms being able
to increase e¢ ciency by sharing the costs with buyers.
4Deneckere and McAfee [1996] provides explanations for damaged goodsusing the downward quality distortion
in the second degree price discrimination, which can be interpreted as a type of demarketing. Again, in our paper,
demarketing allows the seller to price-discriminate better, which in turn, recovers the downward distortion in quality.
5 In the signaling explanation of demarketing, most studies deliberately assume costless marketing. Thus, costless
marketing makes demarketing costly in the sense that demarketing has to give up the opportunity of using costless
marketing activities. This is the reason demarketing incurs a transaction cost which may have a signaling power.
However, marketing is costly in our model, and demarketing is the decision to transfer the cost to the consumer.
6Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat [2010] considers a monopolist who does not price discriminate, but imposes costs
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papers, we consider the situation where costly e¤ort can reduce some friction in the sales process.
Also, in our paper, the party that directly incurs the e¤ort cost is endogenously determined.
In addition, our paper is connected to studies on countervailing incentives, which means that
consumers may have incentives to overstate their preference in our context. In their seminal work in
a principal-agent framework, Lewis and Sappington [1989] show that the presence of countervailing
incentives improves the principals welfare. Jullien [2000] provides a general analysis of type-
dependent participation constraints with a continuum of types. The optimal mechanism with
countervailing incentives and its benet is applied in our paper. We show that inducing consumers to
incur the e¤ort cost generates countervailing incentives, which helps the seller extract the consumers
information rent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3,
we provide a simple example that illustrates our point. In Section 4, the sellers optimal outcome
with marketing is discussed, followed by the sellers optimal outcome with demarketing in Section
5. In Section 6, we endogenize the sellers choice between marketing and demarketing. We extend
our analysis to the case where the seller and the consumer can share a transaction e¤ort in Section
7. In this section, we also study the case where the seller o¤ers special deals through exclusive
channels. We conclude in Section 8. All proofs are in the Appendix.
II. Model
Seller and Buyer We present a monopoly model with second degree price discrimination. The
intensity of consumers preference toward the product is denoted by i 2 fH; Lg; where H (L)
represents high (low) valuation, and   H   L > 0: With a probability 'i; the consumer is
type-i and 'H + 'L = 1: The population of consumers, for simplicity, is normalized to one. The
consumers type is private information, but the probability distribution is common knowledge. The
monopolist o¤ers a menu, (qi; pi)i2fH;Lg; where qi 2 R+ is the product quality and pi 2 R+ is the
lump sum price for a type-i consumer.
A type-i consumer values a product of quality qi with a concave function u(qi; i) that satises
the Inada condition: u(0; i) = 0, uq(q; i) > 0; uq(0; i) = 1; uq(1; i) = 0.7 The value function also
satises:
u(qi)  u(qi;H)  u(qi; L) > 0 and uq (qi)  uq(qi;H)  uq(qi; L) > 0:
Manufacturing the product of quality qi costs cqi to the seller, where c > 0: The sellers prot and
the type-i consumers payo¤ from a transaction are respectively:
i = pi   cqi and Ui = u(qi; i)  pi:
on heterogeneous and imperfectly informed consumers from learning their valuation for the good. An intermediate
such cost can be optimal in this environment.
7The Inada condition allows us to rule out the case where the seller excludes the type-L consumers.
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Marketing and Demarketing The seller engages in marketing (	 = m)to increase the like-
lihood that a transaction takes place. Marketing is a costly e¤ort for the seller. Instead, the seller
can choose demarketing (	 = d) by transferring the cost of transaction to the consumer. In
such a case, without the consumers transaction e¤ort, a purchase might not be made, as discussed
below. However, the consumer may want to make a transaction e¤ort  in such case, she utilizes
the product at an extra cost.
We denote by e 2 f0; 1g the e¤ort level of either party, depending on 	 2 fm; dg: The probability
of purchase is given by:
(e) = e+ (1  e);  2 (0; 1):
With no e¤ort, the probability of transaction is (e = 0) = . When either the seller or the
consumer makes the e¤ort, a transaction can take place with probability (e = 1) = 1. We note
that  > 0; which reects a possibility of random purchases, is required for demarketing to be
optimal. If  = 0; a market transaction never takes place without an e¤ort. As will be shown later,
the optimal demarketing strategy induces only the type-H consumer to exert a transaction e¤ort,
and it becomes equivalent to excluding the type-L consumer. And if  = 0; i.e., the seller excludes
the type-L consumer with demarketing, marketing can always implement the same outcome from
demarketing.
The cost of transaction e¤ort is given by (e) = e for all parties, where  > 0: Although both
the sellers and the consumers transaction e¤ort play the same role, their transaction costs may
not be the same. Adopting symmetric cost, however, allows us to isolate the strategic e¤ect of
demarketing. Our result holds as long as the type-H consumers cost of e¤ort is not signicantly
larger than the type-L consumers.
The situations that we have in mind for our model, in particular, are illustrated in the following
bullet points  purchases are probabilistic without a transaction e¤ort, and the type-H and type-L
consumers cost of transaction e¤ort are similar (in our model they are the same for simplicity).
 When consumers are boundedly rational, they may not be aware of what products are feasible
for purchase even when they know of the existence of products.8 When the seller does not
make an e¤ort to make consumers aware of the products, consumers may have to exert a costly
(cognitive) e¤ort for her awareness.
 For a skill-based product, a costly e¤ort is required to understand product features and func-
tionalities for utilizing the product  either the seller must incur an instruction cost, or the
consumer must incur a learning cost.
In both examples above, if the consumer decides not to exert a transaction e¤ort (under demar-
keting), a transaction may still take place. For example, awareness can come from a third party
8This notion of awareness has been well established in the marketing literature. Consumers in many cases are
considering a small set of feasible alternatives at an earlier stage of the purchasing decision process. The marketing
literature has termed this the consideration set.
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by chance. Likewise, the consumer may happen to know someone who is well informed of product
features and functionalities. Also, in these examples, when the type-H consumer is more knowl-
edgeable or aware of the product, it is likely that she has equal or even lower cost of transaction
e¤ort, compared to the type-L consumer.
Timing of the Game We summarize the timing of the game, depending on the sellers choice
between marketing and demarketing:
1. The seller chooses 	 2 fm; dg:
 Marketing (	 = m)
2. The seller makes a transaction e¤ort, and makes it publicly observable.9
3. The seller commits to a menu of o¤ers contingent on the consumers type, (qi; pi)i2fH;Lg.
4. A transaction takes place.
 Demarketing (	 = d)
2. The seller commits to a menu of o¤ers contingent on the consumers type, (qi; pi)i2fH;Lg.
3. The consumer decides whether or not to make a transaction e¤ort, e 2 f0; 1g:
4. A transaction takes place depending on (e).
Full Information Benchmark The optimal product quality under full information is the rst-
best. We introduce the following notation.
Denition 1 The rst-best outcome is denoted by qi , characterized by:
uq(q

i ; i) = c; i 2 fH;Lg:
Under full information, the seller can implement perfect price discrimination:
pi = u(q

i ; i);
and leaves no surplus to the consumer of either type.
In the subsequent sections, we show that, when the consumers type is her private informa-
tion, demarketing allows the seller to price-discriminate more e¤ectively, and hence can dominate
marketing.
9As will be clear later, we assume that the cost of transaction e¤ort is not prohibitively large that the seller always
wants to exert an e¤ort under marketing.
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III. Illustrative Example
We provide a simple example that illustrates our point. Suppose the consumers value schedule
with the product of quality level q is as follows:
High-type Low-type
q = 2 : u(2;H) = 4 u(2; L) = 2:5
q = 1 : u(1;H) = 3 u(1; L) = 2
q = 0 : u(0;H) = 0 u(0; L) = 0
The consumers payo¤ is u   p; where p is the price. The sellers prot is p   q; where the cost is
given by q: The consumers type is her private information. The probability that the consumer
is high-type is 'H = 1=4 (thus 'L = 3=4); which is common knowledge. The cost of transaction
e¤ort is  = 1=2: If a transaction e¤ort is made, then the transaction takes place with certainty. If
a transaction e¤ort is not made, then the transaction takes place with probability of  = 1=2:
Under full information, the optimal outcome is the rst best and: qH = 2 with p

H = 4 (for the
high-type consumer, the product quality level is 2 and the price is 4) and qL = 1 with p

L = 2 (for
the low-type consumer, the product quality level is 1 and the price is 2). Therefore, the consumer
surplus of either type is zero, and the sellers expected prot is:  = 14 (4 2)+ 34 (2 1) = 54 : When
the consumers type is private information the high type consumer has an incentive to mimic the
low type consumer to command a strictly positive consumer surplus of u(1;H)  2 = 1:
Below we present the sellers optimal o¤ers and expected prots with the marketing and the
demarketing strategy when the consumers type is her private information.
 Marketing (the seller exerts an e¤ort): In this case, a surplus of u = 1 must be provided to the
high-type consumer to keep her from mimicking the low-type. In this simple setting, pooling
and separating strategy yield the same prot. The sellers pooling strategy is qH = qL = 1
with pH = pL = 2; and his expected prot is:
m =
1
4
[2  1] + 3
4
[2  1]  1
2
=
1
2
:
 Demarketing (the seller exerts no e¤ort): With demarketing, inducing both types to exert a
transaction e¤ort gives the same prot as the case with marketing. Suppose the seller induces
only the high-type consumer to exert a transaction e¤ort to separate the consumers types.
To induce the high-type consumer to exert a transaction e¤ort, the sellers o¤er must satisfy:
u(2;H)  pH   1=2 = 12 [u(2;H)  pH ] : The LHS of the equation is the high-type consumers
payo¤when she decides to exert a transaction e¤ort by incurring the cost 1=2: The RHS is her
expected payo¤ if she decides to exert no e¤ort  the payo¤ is realized with probability 1=2.
From the equation, since u(2;H) = 4, the seller charges pH = 3 for qH = 2: For the low-type
consumer, qL = 1 with pL = 2: The low-type consumer will not exert an e¤ort since she is not
compensated for the transaction cost. The high-type consumers surplus is: 4 3 1=2 = 1=2
(< 1); and she has no incentive to mimic the low-type consumer with or without a transaction
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e¤ort since: 12 [u(1;H)  2] = 1=2 without a transaction e¤ort, and u(1;H)   2   1=2 = 1=2:
The sellers expected prot is:
d =
1
4
[3  2] + 3
4

1
2
(2  1)

=
5
8
:
The example above illustrates the central trade-o¤ between marketing and demarketing: sales
opportunity vs. surplus extraction. The game tree in Figure 1 represents the example.
Place Figure 1 here
IV. Marketing: The Seller Makes a Transaction E¤ort
In this section, we analyze more generally the sellers optimal o¤ers when he engages in marketing
(	 = m). In what follows, we denote by em the sellers transaction e¤ort. Since the seller does not
know the consumers type when deciding whether or not to exert a transaction e¤ort, the sellers
choice of e¤ort level is:
em 2 argmaxbem
n
(bem) hX
i
'i (pi   cqi)
i
  bemo
The expression above implies that if the following inequality,
(1)  < (1  ) 'H  u(qH ;H)  u(qmL )  cqH+ 'L (u(qmL ; L)  cqmL ) ;
holds, where qmL is dened by uq(q
m
L ; L) = c +
'H
'L
uq (q
m
L ), then the seller exerts full e¤ort, i.e.,
em = 1. Throughout this paper, we assume that the transaction cost is not too large so that (1) is
always satised.
Provided that (1) holds, the sellers problem is the standard non-linear pricing that screens the
consumers type. With 	 = m; the seller solves the following problem:
(2) Max
q;p
m =
X
i
'i (pi   cqi)  ; s.t.
(3) u(qi; i)  pi  0; i 2 fH;Lg;
(4) u(qi; i)  pi  u(qj ; i)  pj ; i; j 2 fH;Lg:
The rst constraints, (3), are the participation constraints for the consumer, and the second
constraints, (4), assures that the consumers payo¤ is higher when she truthfully represents her
type.
The following proposition presents the sellers optimal o¤er when the seller makes a transaction
e¤ort.
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Proposition 1 With marketing, the sellers optimal o¤ers are characterized as follows:
qmH = q

H and q
m
L < q

L,
pmH < p

H and p
m
L < p

L.
The result above is standard. The product quality for a type-H consumer is at the rst best level,
known as e¢ ciency at the top in the literature, but the product quality for a type-L consumer
is distorted downwards. In models of this type, the type-H consumer has an incentive to mimic
the type-L consumer to reap an information rent of u(qL): The seller discourages such a mimicry
by distorting the product quality for the type-L consumer downwards. As a result, the seller must
reduce both pH and pL from the rst best levels (pH < pH and pL < p

L), resulting in imperfect
price discrimination.
V. Demarketing: The Consumer Makes a Transaction E¤ort
We now proceed to the case where the seller engages in demarketing. In this case, the sellers
choice of price and quality can a¤ect the consumers incentive to make a transaction e¤ort. The
key di¤erence from the case in the previous section is the fact that, when the demarketing strategy
is chosen, the seller can induce only a particular type of consumer to make a transaction e¤ort.
In other words, the seller can manipulate o¤ers in a way that one type of consumer purchases the
product by making a transaction e¤ort, while the other type may purchase the product only by
chance without a transaction e¤ort.
Before we proceed, we rst establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the seller prefers demarketing to marketing, then the seller induces only the type-H
consumer to make a transaction e¤ort.
It is not di¢ cult to see that inducing both the type-H and the type-L consumer to make a
transaction e¤ort simply makes it more costly to the seller, compared to the case in which the seller
makes a transaction e¤ort. Since the type-L consumer gets zero consumer surplus from a purchase,
she has no incentive to make a transaction e¤ort. Therefore, to incentivize the type-L consumer,
the seller must provide her with a strictly positive consumer surplus. Such a surplus to the type-L
consumer, however, makes the type-H consumer misrepresent her type. As a result, the seller must
provide the additional surplus to both the type-H and the type-L consumer.
Similarly, it is suboptimal for the seller to induce only the type-L consumer to make a transaction
e¤ort. To do so, the seller must compensate the type-L consumers e¤ort by decreasing pL; which
encourages the type-H consumer to misrepresent her type as the type-L consumer. Again, the seller
will simply end up providing more consumer surplus under this arrangement.
Another possibility is that the seller induces neither type to make a transaction e¤ort. This
case, however, is no di¤erent from when the seller chooses the marketing strategy without making
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an e¤ort. This is the case when  is so large that (1) does not hold  marketing and demarketing
become e¤ectively the same. To di¤erentiate the two strategies, we assume that  is not too large.
In what follows, we denote by edi a type-i consumers transaction e¤ort. The type-i consumers
problem when deciding whether to make a transaction e¤ort is:
(5) edi 2 argmaxbeid (beid) [u(qi; i)  pi]  beid; i 2 fH;Lg:
To induce edH = 1; the sellers optimal o¤er for the type-H consumer must satisfy:
(6) u(qH ;H)  pH  
1   :
On the other hand, the seller wants to ensure that the type-L consumer prefers not to make a
transaction e¤ort, i.e., edL = 0:
(7) u(qL; L)  pL  
1  
Since consumer surplus must be non-negative, the sellers maximization problem must satisfy the
following participation constraints for the consumer:
(8) u(qH ;H)  pH     0;
(9)  [u(qL; L)  pL]  0:
Finally, as the revelation principle applies in our model, the sellers o¤er must satisfy the incentive
constraints for the consumers truthful behavior:
(10) u(qH ;H)  pH     max
(
u(qL;H)  pL   ;
 [u(qL;H)  pL]
)
;
(11)  [u(qL; L)  pL]  max
(
u(qH ; L)  pH   ;
 [u(qH ; L)  pH ]
)
:
The constraints above assure that the consumers payo¤ from truthfully representing her type (the
left hand sides) is higher than her payo¤ from misrepresentation (the right hand sides). The right
hand sides of (10) and (11) exhibit the consumers choice of whether or not to make a transaction
e¤ort if she decides to misrepresent her type.
When inducing only the type-H consumer to make a transaction e¤ort, the sellers problem is
as follows:
(12) Max
q;p
d = 'H (pH   cqH) + 'L (pL   cqL) ;
subject to (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) and (11): Notice that (6) implies (8):
We distinguish three regimes for the optimal outcome when the seller engages in demarketing
and only the type-H consumer makes a transaction e¤ort. To characterize the optimal outcomes
in each regime, we rst present the following cuto¤ levels of the transaction cost.
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Denition 2 Let   (1  )u (qL) and   (1  )u (qH).
The following proposition characterizes the sellers optimal o¤ers with a demarketing strategy in
which only the type-H consumer is induced to make a transaction e¤ort.
Proposition 2 With demarketing, the sellers optimal o¤ers with eH = 1 and eL = 0 are charac-
terized as follows:
 When  < : qdH = qmH . For  close enough to zero, qdL < qmL , pdH > pmH and pdL < pmL . For
 close enough to , qdL > q
m
L , p
d
H < p
m
H and p
d
L > p.
 When  2 [; ]: qdi = qi 8i, pdH = pH   1  , and pdL = pL.
 When  > : qdH > qmH , qdL = qL, pdH < pmH , and pdL < pmL .
When the transaction cost is su¢ ciently small, i.e.,  < ; the type-H consumers information
rent u(qL) is large enough that the seller does not need to compensate her for a transaction e¤ort,
and consequently, pdH > p
m
H : Yet, the type-L consumers lack of transaction e¤ort leads to a larger
quality distortion compared to the one with 	 = m (qdL < q
m
L ): As a result, the price for the
type-L consumer also becomes lower (pdL < p
m
L ). As the transaction cost increases, the seller must
incentivize the type-H consumer to make an e¤ort by providing a discount (pdH < p
m
H). This extra
consumer surplus is provided only when the type-H consumer truthfully represents her type as H,
which allows the seller to recover some of the distortion in the optimal product quality for the type-L
consumer (qdL > q
m
L ): As a result, the price for the type-L consumer becomes higher than when the
seller chooses the marketing strategy (pdL > p
m
L ): In this regime ( < ); as the transaction cost 
increases, although demarketing allows the seller to recover the distortion in qL by extracting the
type-H consumers information, the seller still cannot completely restore the rst-best quality level.
As the transaction cost increases further, i.e.,  2 [; ]; while it becomes more costly to induce
the type-H consumer to make a transaction e¤ort, her private information becomes less of a problem.
Within this intermediate range, the sellers extra discount for the type-H consumer to induce her
e¤ort is large enough that the type-H consumer no longer has an incentive to misrepresent her
type as type-L: In other words, countervailing incentives arise in this range of the transaction
cost  the type-H consumers incentive to acquire information rent is mitigated by her incentive
to be compensated for her transaction e¤ort. Consequently, the seller does not need to distort
the product qualities in his optimal o¤er to extract the consumers surplus linked to her private
information (qdi = q

i ; 8i): In this range of the transaction cost, although the seller must give the
type-H consumer a discount for her e¤ort, the sellers price discrimination is e¢ cient.
As the transaction cost becomes yet larger, i.e.,  > , the discount to the type-H consumer leads
to the reverse incentiveproblem. In this regime, the type-H consumer has no misrepresenting
incentive, but the type-L consumer has such an incentive when she purchases the product by chance.
To discourage the type-L consumer from mimicking type-H consumer, the seller must increase pH ;
but this will discourage the type-H consumers transaction e¤ort. As a result, the seller must
12
increase the product quality for the type-H consumer from the rst-best level (qdH > q

H):
10 In
addition to increasing pH ; the seller also gives the type-L consumer a discount to prevent mimicry.
As a result, the price for the type-L consumer becomes lower compared to the case with 	 = m
(pdL < p
m
L ):
In summary, unlike the marketing strategy, the demarketing strategy brings about di¤erent
incentive problems according to the size of the transaction cost. In the next section, we examine
pros and cons of each strategy, and endogenize the sellers choice of 	 2 fm; dg.
VI. Choice between Marketing and Demarketing
By incurring the transaction cost directly (	 = m); the seller can sell his product with certainty 
the transaction will always take place. However, the seller then makes an e¤ort regardless of the
consumers type. Moreover, with the marketing strategy, the seller must always provide type-H
consumer with strictly positive information rent.
The demarketing strategy (	 = d) brings more exibility, allowing the seller to induce the
consumers transaction e¤ort depending on the consumers type (only the type-H consumer in
the optimum). Such exibility allows the seller to partially save the transaction cost, but more
importantly, it has a strategic benet. In particular, when the e¤ort cost is neither too small
nor too large, the demarketing strategy creates the consumers countervailing incentives the
type-H consumers incentive to mimic the type-L consumer in order to command information rent
is alleviated since she is compensated for her transaction e¤ort only when she chooses the bundle of
fqH ; pHg. That is, the demarketing strategy enables the seller to extract the consumers information
rent more e¤ectively.
From Proposition 1, we obtain the sellers expected prot m(), whereas Proposition 2 char-
acterizes d(). With marketing, the seller himself exerts a transaction e¤ort and hence the e¤ort
cost directly a¤ects the sellers objective function, and m() is linearly decreasing. With demar-
keting, however, the type-H consumers e¤ort must be induced and therefore the cost of e¤ort
a¤ects the seller indirectly, and d() is concavely decreasing in : This leads to our main result
 we characterize the sellers optimal strategy depending on the transaction cost in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose   H  L is large enough. Then, there exist l and h (> l) such that
m() > d() for  < l and  > h, while m() < d() for  2 (l; h) :
 When  < l, the seller chooses marketing.
 When  2 [l; h], the seller chooses demarketing.
10The outcome under the reverse incentive problem may explain the excessive qualities of some products and services
 e.g., there are exceptionally ne restaurants that limit the number of seats. See Kotler and Levy [1971] for more
examples.
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 When  > h, the seller chooses marketing.
For a small transaction cost, the compensation to the type-H consumer for making a transaction
e¤ort with demarketing is also small  the compensation for the type-H consumers e¤ort is not
attractive enough for her to give up taking advantage of her private information. The seller with
the demarketing strategy, therefore, still has to provide signicant information rent to induce the
consumers truthful behavior. With the marketing strategy, although information rent needs to be
provided to the type-H consumer, the seller can have a higher probability of transaction at a low
cost. When the transaction cost is small, the benet from marketing outweighs the benet from
demarketing.
When the transaction cost is not so small, the marketing strategy becomes less attractive to
the seller, while the demarketing strategy becomes more attractive. Despite the lower chance
of transaction, demarketing enables the seller to extract the consumers information rent when the
transaction cost is intermediate, leading to more e¢ cient price discrimination. This e¤ect dominates
when the di¤erence in the consumers valuations is large enough, and consequently, the seller prefers
the demarketing strategy.
When the transaction cost is large, however, the strategic merit in the demarketing strategy
vanishes since it brings about the reverse incentive problem. Under the reverse incentive problem,
the same compensation for transaction e¤ort given to the type-H consumer must also be provided
to the type-L consumer. It becomes too costly to induce the consumers transaction e¤ort, and the
seller again prefers the marketing strategy.
An interesting question is how a change in  a¤ects the sellers optimal strategy. Recall that an
increase in  implies that the transaction e¤ort becomes less important. We nd that as  rises, the
parameter range for demarketing to be optimal becomes greater. The sellers expected prot with
marketing m remains the same, whereas that with demarketing d is increasing in . Applying
the envelope theorem to (12), we obtain:
@d
@

qi=qdi
= 'L
 
pdL   cqdL

> 0;
which leads to the following Corollary immediately.
Corollary 1 @l()@ < 0 and
@h()
@ > 0:
The intuition is straightforward. Demarketing reduces a market transaction with the type-L
consumers by probability 1   : This cost of demarketing becomes smaller in . This result,
however, has to be carefully understood. When  is su¢ ciently large and, for example, close to 1,
the seller may decide neither to make an e¤ort himself nor to induce it from the consumer. That
is, when (1) does not hold, marketing is no di¤erent than demarketing. Thus, the result that
demarketing becomes more attractive as  rises is valid under the assumption that (1) holds, i.e.,
when  is not prohibitively large.
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As mentioned before, the transaction costs may not be the same for the two types. Suppose
(H) > (L); i.e., the type-H consumers cost is higher than the type-L consumers, as in models
of price discrimination through coupons. If the gap between (H) and (L) is small enough, then
demarketing by inducing only the type-H consumer to exerts a transaction e¤ort is still optimal. If
(H) < (L), then it reinforces our result since it is relatively cheaper to induce the type-H consumer
to exert an e¤ort. In general, as (H) becomes smaller relative to (L); demarketing becomes more
attractive to the seller. While some previous studies, such as those with price discrimination using
coupons, show that it is optimal to induce only the type-L consumer to incur the transaction cost
for (H) > (L), our study suggests that if the gap is not signicant, or (H)  (L), it can be
optimal to induce only the type-H consumer to induce the transaction cost.
VII. Extensions
In this section, we extend our analysis in two directions. First, we allow the possibility of joint
transaction e¤ort made both by the seller and the consumer. Second, we look at a case in which
the seller o¤ers the menu for a type-H consumer only through an exclusive sales channel for which
the consumers transaction e¤ort is required.
VII(i). Possibility of Sharing a Transaction E¤ort
Thus far, we have considered that the transaction cost is incurred by either the seller or the consumer.
We now investigate the case where the seller can share the transaction cost with the consumer. The
seller chooses three e¤ort levels, em; edH ; e
d
L 2 [0; 1]; where em is the sellers transaction e¤ort, and edH
and edL are the type-H and the type-L consumers transaction e¤ort respectively (the seller chooses
edH and e
d
L respecting the consumers incentives).
Our base framework, and what we have shown in the previous sections implies the following
points. First, em + edi  1; i 2 fH;Lg in the optimum. Otherwise, there will be a wasted e¤ort.
In our framework, therefore, the likelihood of transaction, (e); becomes:
(em + edi ) = e
m + edi +

1  (em + edi )

; i 2 fH;Lg:
Second, em + edi < 1 for 8i is suboptimal. If em + edi < 1 for 8i; then (1) implies that increasing
em until em + edi = 1 dominates such cases. Third, similar to Lemma 1, inducing e
m + edH < 1 and
em + edL = 1 is suboptimal. To induce type-L consumer to make an e¤ort higher than the type-H
consumer, the sellers compensation to the type-L consumer encourages the type-H consumer to
misrepresent her type as type-L. As a result, the seller must provide the additional rent to the
type-H consumer as well as the type-L consumer.
The discussion above implies that, in the optimum:
(13) edH = 1  em and edL < 1  em:
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The constraints the seller faces for the consumers e¤ort is:
(14) edi 2 argmaxbedi

(em + bedi ) [u(qi; i)  pi]  bedi 	 ; i 2 fH;Lg:
Since edH = 1   em from (13) and the consumers problem is linear in edi , a type-i consumer
chooses edi = 1  em if she makes an e¤ort and edi = 0 otherwise. Then, by (13); edL = 1  em and
edL = 0 for demarketing to be optimal. That is, (14) and (13) imply:
(15) u(qH ;H)  pH   (1  em)  [em + (1  em)] [u(qH ;H)  pH ] ;
(16) [em + (1  em)] [u(qL; L)  pL]  u(qL; L)  pL   (1  em):
Notice that, with em = 1, then (15) and (16) become identities  if only the seller exerts a
transaction e¤ort, then the consumers incentive for an e¤ort becomes irrelevant.
Proposition 4 With demarketing, suppose the seller can share a fraction of the consumers trans-
action e¤ort. If 'L is small enough, the seller will not exert any transaction e¤ort.
As in Proposition 3, demarketing is optimal when   H   L is large enough, but even if the
seller can share the consumers transaction e¤ort, he would not do so if the consumer is unlikely to
be type-L: Recall that demarketing allows the seller to save the cost of transaction e¤ort, depending
on the consumers type. When there is no need to let the consumer exert the entire transaction
e¤ort with demarketing, the seller may also exert some e¤ort  because edL = 0 in the demarketing
strategy, if the consumer is likely to be type-L; exerting em > 0 allows the seller to recover some
potential sales loss from type-L consumer. If the consumer is unlikely to be type-L; however, the
seller will exert no e¤ort to save the cost of transaction e¤ort.
VII(ii). Possibility of Exclusive Channel Strategy
So far, we have assumed that the seller always o¤ers the full menu, fqH ; pH : qL; pLg. O¤ering the
full menu is optimal when the seller employs the marketing strategy (	 = m). When employing the
demarketing strategy (	 = d); however, the seller may have more room to manipulate the availability
of the menu, depending on the consumers transaction e¤ort. In this section, we distinguish two
di¤erent strategies under demarketing. The rst one is the demarketing strategy which has already
been discussed  o¤ering full menu, fqH ; pH : qL; pLg, regardless of the consumers transaction
e¤ort.
The second one is the strategy that makes fqH ; pHg available only for the consumer who makes
a transaction e¤ort (ed = 1); while making fqL; pLg available for the consumer regardless of the
consumers e¤ort. For example, the seller can set up di¤erent purchasing channels for the consumer:
the exclusive channel through which fqH ; pHg is o¤ered only for the consumer who makes an
e¤ort to access the exclusive channel. This can be thought of as special discounts or deals for which
consumers must incur a transaction e¤ort. For example, some companies o¤er certain products for
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sale only online and do not make them available in their retail stores, and vice versa. Some fast food
and co¤ee franchises, such as In-N-Out, McDonalds and Starbucks, o¤er fancier menus through less
known channels.11 These exclusive sales channelsare available only to the consumers who make
an e¤ort to acquire information. Another example is when some retailers o¤er special deals or sales
through e-mails only when consumers incur a hasslecost, such as submitting a long survey.12 We
refer this to the exclusive channel strategy (	 = ed).
We assume that, with the exclusive channel strategy, the full menu fqH ; pH : qL; pLg is available
only through an exclusive sales channel so that without making a transaction e¤ort, the consumer
cannot have an access to fqH ; pHg  only fqL; pLg is available to the consumer if she makes
no transaction e¤ort. Figure 2 illustrates the di¤erence among marketing (	 = m), demarketing
(	 = d) and exclusive channel strategy (	 = ed).
Place Figure 2 here
The di¤erence between the two strategies is clear from the gure. Unlike the demarketing
strategy, the exclusive channel strategy does not physically allow the type-L consumer to mimic the
type-H consumer without making a transaction e¤ort. This leads to two changes. First, if the
type-H consumer decides not to make a transaction e¤ort, only the low-quality product is available
for her (as before, the chance that she nds the product is  in such a case). Therefore, the condition
for the type-H consumers transaction e¤ort becomes:
(17) u(qH ;H)  pH      [u(qL;H)  pL] :
Second, the type-L consumer must incur the transaction cost if she decides to mimic type-H:
Therefore, instead of (11) in the demarketing strategy, the seller must satisfy the following incentive
constraint for the type-L consumers truthful behavior:
(18)  [u(qL; L)  pL]  u(qH ; L)  pH   :
The seller maximizes his expected payo¤ in (12); subject to (8); (9); (17); (10) and (18): To
characterize the optimal outcomes in each regime, we rst present the following cuto¤ levels of the
transaction cost.
Denition 3 Let e  (1  )u(qmL ).
The sellers optimal o¤ers with the exclusive channel strategy are presented in the next proposi-
tion.
11See, for example, Bryant [2014].
12See The Wall Street Journal, Why pay full price?, May 5. 2011.
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Proposition 5 With 	 = ed; the sellers optimal o¤ers with the exclusive channel strategy are
characterized as follows:
 When  < e: eqdH = qmH and eqdL < qmL , epdH < pmH and epdL < pmL .
 When   e: eqdH = qmH and eqdL = qmL , epdH  pmH , and epdL = pmL .
When  is small enough, the e¤ect is similar to the demarketing strategy. The type-H consumers
information rent is large enough relative to  that the seller does not need to compensate her for
her transaction e¤ort, which leads to epdH > pmH : The fact that the type-L consumer does not make
a transaction e¤ort leads to a larger quality distortion in the product compared to the case with
marketing (eqdL < qmL ): As a result, the price for the type-L consumer becomes lower (epdL < pmL ) as
well.
As  becomes larger, the seller must incentivize the type-H consumer to make a transaction e¤ort
by providing a discount. However, the e¤ect of the exclusive channel strategy becomes di¤erent from
that of the demarketing strategy. First, under the demarketing strategy, the type-H consumer can
truthfully reveal her type regardless of her transaction e¤ort. Under the exclusive channel strategy,
however, if the type-H consumer decides not to make a transaction e¤ort, she cannot reveal her true
type (only the price-quality bundle for the type-L consumer is o¤ered through the regular channel).
Second, recall that, under the demarketing strategy when  is large, the type-L consumer has an
incentive to mimic the type-H consumer (without making a transaction e¤ort). This, however, is
not the case under the exclusive channel strategy. The type-L consumer must incur the transaction
cost to mimic type-H: These two e¤ects together, when   e; make the product quality levels
identical to those in the case of marketing (eqdH = qmH and eqdL = qmL ): The only di¤erence from the
marketing strategy is that pH is higher (epdH > pmH for  > e) since the seller must compensate the
consumer for her transaction e¤ort.
We now compare the three strategies that we have discussed to demonstrate the robustness of the
demarketing strategy. As shown below, demarketing strategy blended with special deals through
exclusive channels can dominate the marketing strategy. The next proposition presents the sellers
optimal choice when the exclusive channel strategy is available.
Proposition 6 Suppose   H   L is large enough. Then, there exists eh < h such thated() > maxfm();d()g for  > eh:
 When  < l, the seller chooses marketing.
 When  2 [l; eh], the seller chooses demarketing.
 When  > eh, the seller chooses demarketing with exclusive channels.
With the exclusive channel strategy, the type-L consumers incentive to mimic type-H is not an
issue since the high-quality product is available only through the exclusive channel. This has both a
negative and a positive e¤ect. The negative e¤ect is that the consumers countervailing incentives
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under the demarketing strategy vanishes under the exclusive channel strategy. As mentioned above,
the exclusive channel strategy does not allow the type-H consumer to reveal her true type without
making a transaction e¤ort. As a result, with the exclusive channel strategy, the seller cannot
achieve the rst-best product qualities for both types when the transaction cost is intermediate.
The positive side is that the exclusive channel strategy eliminates the reverse incentivewhen the
transaction cost is large. For large transaction costs, therefore, the exclusive channel strategy allows
the seller to avoid giving a discount to the type-L consumer without an upward distortion in qH .
In summary, for intermediate transaction costs, the demarketing strategy generates counter-
vailing incentives, which enables the seller to price-discriminate more e¤ectively by extracting the
consumers information rent. For large transaction costs, the exclusive channel strategy dominates
the demarketing strategy because the seller e¤ectively price-discriminates with respect to the con-
sumers transaction e¤ort, which cannot be implemented with the full menu strategy. Finally, the
exclusive channel strategy dominates the marketing strategy because the seller can save the e¤ort
cost for the type-L consumer without having the reverse incentive problem. The result is illustrated
in Figure 3.
Place Figure 3 here
Before we close this section, we discuss the possibility of di¤erent types of strategies. For
example, one may ask if it can be optimal to o¤er fqL; pLg only in the exclusive channel, while
o¤ering fqH ; pH : qL; pLg in the regular channel. That is, the seller has to induce the type-L
consumer to make an e¤ort for purchase fqL; pLg: In this case, the seller can induce a transaction
e¤ort either from both types, or only from the type-L consumer. However, as shown in Lemma 1,
this case cannot dominate the marketing strategy.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that a seller can employ demarketing as an instrument for price
discrimination. We have dened marketing as the seller making an e¤ort to increase the likelihood
of a transaction, and demarketing as the seller not making such e¤ort. Our result suggests that,
when a consumers preference is private information, demarketing can dominate marketing. We have
shown that in the optimal demarketing strategy, the seller induces the high-valuation consumers to
exert an e¤ort for transaction, without inducing the low-valuation consumers to do so. This strategy
allows the seller to be able to extract the consumers surplus more e¤ectively. According to our
results, when the transaction cost is small or large, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing.
For intermediate transaction costs, by contrast, the seller may prefer demarketing. We have also
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shown that, with exclusive sales channels, demarketing can be the optimal strategy even for large
transaction costs.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Since  does not play any role, only (4) for the type-H consumer and (3) for the type-L consumer
are binding as in a standard screening problem:
(19) pH = u(qH ;H)  u(qL) and pL = u(qL; L):
Substituting for pH and pL in the objective function in (2); we solve:
(20) Max
qH ;qL
'H

u(qH ;H)  u(qL)  cqH

+ 'L [u(qL; L)  cqL]  :
The rst-order conditions give:
uq(q
m
H ;H) = c and uq(q
m
L ; L) = c+
'H
'L
uq (q
m
L );
implying that qmH = q

H and q
m
L < q

L: From (19), p
m
H < p

H and p
m
L < p

L:
Proof of Lemma 1.
We show that, with 	 = d; (i) the case in which the seller induces a transaction e¤ort from the con-
sumer regardless of her type and (ii) the case in which the seller only induces the type-L consumers
transaction e¤ort are both dominated by the sellers optimal outcome with 	 = m: First, suppose,
with 	 = d, the seller induces a transaction e¤ort from both types. Then, the following constraint
must be satised:
u(qi; i)  pi      [u(qi; i)  pi] ; i 2 fH;Lg;
which can be rewritten as:
(21) u(qi; i)  pi  
1   ; i 2 fH;Lg.
The consumers participation constraint u(qi; i)   pi     0 is implied by (21) regardless of her
type. The constraints that induce the consumers truthful representation of her type are:
(22) u(qi; i)  pi     max
(
u(qj ; i)  pj   ;
 [u(qj ; i)  pj ]
)
; i; j 2 fH;Lg.
The RHS of (22) exhibits the consumers choice of whether or not to exert a transaction e¤ort if
she decides to misrepresent her type (o¤ the equilibrium path). To simplify (22); we rst make the
following claim.
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Claim 4 Suppose (21) holds. Then, the inequality below must hold if (22) for a type-i consumer is
binding:
u(qj ; i)  pj  
1   ; i; j 2 fH;Lg.
Proof. Suppose u(qj ; i)  pj < 1  ; which implies that u(qj ; i)  pj   <  [u(qj ; i)  pj ] in the
RHS of (22): Then, binding (22) for a type-i consumer can be rewritten as:
u(qi; i)  pi   
1   = 

u(qj ; i)  pj   
1  

;
which is a contradiction since the LHS of the equation is positive by (21), but the RHS is negative.
Claim 1 implies that RHS of (22) is u(qj ; i)  pj  : Therefore, (22) becomes the same as (4) in
the case with 	 = m, since  cancels out with each other in both sides of (22). The sellers problem
then is written as:
Max
qi;pi
X
i
'i (pi   cqi) ;
subject to
(23) u(qi; i)  pi  
1   ; i 2 fH;Lg;
(24) u(qi; i)  pi  u(qj ; i)  pj ; i; j 2 fH;Lg:
Compared to the case with 	 = m, there are two di¤erences. First, the transaction cost  is
transferred to the consumer, and second, the consumers reservation payo¤ is 1  : As usual, (23)
for type-L and (24) for the type-H consumer are binding at the optimum, and we have expression
for pi; i 2 fH;Lg; from these binding constraints. After substituting for the prices in the sellers
objective function, the optimization problem becomes:
(25) Max
qH ;qL
'H

u(qH ;H)  u(qL)  cqH

+ 'L [u(qL; L)  cqL] 

1   :
Directly comparing (25) to (20) shows that the sellers prot with 	 = d is strictly lower than his
prot with 	 = m:
Next, suppose, with 	 = d, the seller induces a transaction e¤ort only from the type-L consumer.
Then, the following constraint must be satised:
(26) u(qL; L)  pL  
1   .
The constraints that induce the consumers truthful representation of her type are:
(27)  [u(qH ;H)  pH ]  max
(
u(qL;H)  pL   ;
 [u(qL;H)  pL]
)
;
(28) u(qL; L)  pL     max
(
u(qH ; L)  pL   ;
 [u(qH ; L)  pH ]
)
.
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Claim 5 Suppose u(qH ;H)  pH < 1  . Then, the inequality below must hold:
u(qL;H)  pL < 
1   .
Proof. Suppose u(qL;H)  pL  1  ; which implies that u(qL;H)  pL    [u(qL;H)  pL]
in the RHS of (27): Then, (27) with a simple manipulation gives:


u(qH ;H)  pH   
1  

 u(qL;H)  pL   
1   ;
which is a contradiction since the LHS is negative, but the RHS is positive.
Claim 2 implies that the RHS of (27) is  [u(qL;H)  pL] : Also by Claim 1, RHS of (28) is
u(qH ; L)   pL   . Therefore, (27) and (28) become the same as (4) in the case with 	 = m:
For type-L consumer, (26) implies that the constraint for her participation, u(qL; L)  pL     0,
is automatically satised. By Claim 2, (27) is written as u(qH ;H)   pH  u(qL;H)   pL; which
implies that the participation constraint for the type-H consumer u(qH ;H) pH  0 is automatically
satised. Therefore, the sellers problem is written as:
Max
q;p
'H (pH   cqH) + 'L (pL   cqL) ;
subject to
(29) u(qL; L)  pL  
1   ;
(30) u(qi; i)  pi  u(qj ; i)  pj ; i; j 2 fH;Lg:
Again, by Claim 1 and 2, (27) and (28) become the constraints in (30): It can be easily shown that
(29) and (30) for the type-H are binding, and (30) for the type-L consumer is slack. By substituting
for pL and pH in the objective function, the sellers problem becomes:
(31) Max
qH ;qL
'H

u(qH ;H)  u(qL)  cqH   
1  

+ 'L

u(qL; L)  cqL   
1  

:
Clearly, the sellers prot in (31) is even smaller than its prot in (25). 
Proof of Proposition 2.
We rst establish the following two claims.
Claim 6 Suppose (6) holds. Then, the inequality below must hold if (10) is binding:
u(qL;H)  pL  
1   .
Proof. Suppose u(qL;H)  pL < 1  ; which implies that u(qL;H)  pL  <  [u(qL;H)  pL]
in the RHS of (10) Then, binding (10) can be rewritten as:
u(qH ;H)  pH   
1   = 

u(qL;H)  pL   
1  

;
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which is a contradiction since the LHS is positive by (6), but the RHS is negative.
The Claim above implies that RHS of (10) is u(qL;H) pL : Therefore, (10) can be rewritten
as u(qH ;H)  pH  u(qL;H)  pL:
Claim 7 Suppose u(qL; L)  pL < 1  . Then, the inequality below must hold:
u(qH ; L)  pH < 
1   .
Proof. Suppose u(qH ; L) pH  1  ; which implies that u(qH ; L) pH     [u(qH ; L)  pH ]
in the RHS of (11). Then, (11) with a simple manipulation gives:


u(qL; L)  pL   
1  

 u(qH ; L)  pH   
1   ;
which is a contradiction since the LHS is negative, but the RHS is positive.
The Claim above implies that RHS of (11) is  [u(qL;H)  pL] : Therefore, (11) can be rewritten
as u(qL; L)  pL  u(qH ; L)  pH :
It can be easily shown that (7) is automatically satised by the solution without it in our problem.
Also, (6) implies (8), and by Claims 3 and 4, the incentive compatibility constraints (10) and (11)
can be rewritten respectively as:
u(qH ;H)  pH  u(qL;H)  pL and
u(qL; L)  pL  u(qH ; L)  pH :
Thus, the Lagrangian of the sellers problem can be written as:
L = 'H (pH   cqH) + 'L (pL   cqL)
+ 1

u(qH ;H)  pH   
1  

+ 2[u(qL; L)  pL]
+ 3 [u(qH ;H)  pH   u(qL;H) + pL]
+ 4 [u(qL; L)  pL   u(qH ; L) + pH ] :
In the optimum:
(32)
@L
@pH
= 'H   1   3 + 4 = 0;
(33)
@L
@pL
= 'L   2 + 3   4 = 0;
(34)
@L
@qH
=  'Hc+ (1 + 3)uq(qH ;H)  4uq(qH ; L) = 0;
(35)
@L
@qL
=  'Lc+ (2 + 4)uq(qL; L)  3uq(qL;H) = 0;
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(36)
@L
@1
= u(qH ;H)  pH   
1    0; 1
@L
@1
= 0;
(37)
@L
@2
= u(qL; L)  pL  0; 2 @L
@2
= 0;
(38)
@L
@3
= u(qH ;H)  pH   u(qL;H) + pL  0; 3 @L
@3
= 0;
(39)
@L
@4
= u(qL; L)  pL   u(qH ; L) + pH  0; 4 @L
@4
= 0:
As will be shown below, the rst regime,  <  is divided into two sub-regimes,  <  and
 2 [; ); and  >  is also divided into two sub-regimes,  2 (; ] and  > : The following two
Claims establish the binding constraints in each case.
Claim 8 34 = 0, i.e., (10) and (11) cannot be simultaneously binding.
Proof. Suppose 3 > 0 and 4 > 0. Then, from (32) and (33), 3 = 'H   1 + 4 and
4 = 'L 2+3: Also, from (34) and (35), 3 = 'Hcuq(qH ;H)  1+
uq(qH ;L)
uq(qH ;H)
4 and 4 =
'Lc
uq(qL;L)
 
2+
uq(qL;H)
uq(qL;L)
3: These equations imply that uq(qH ;H) = uq(qL; L) = uq(qH ; L) = uq(qL;H); which
is not possible.
Claim 9 If 4 = 0 (3 = 0), then 2 > 0 (1 > 0) and qdH = q

H (q
d
L = q

L). In other words, (i)
if (10) is non-binding, then (6) is binding and qdH = q

H , and (ii) if (11) is non-binding, then (8) is
binding and qdL = q

L.
Proof. Suppose 4 = 2 = 0: (35) gives 3 < 0; which is a contradiction. From (32) and (34)
with 4 = 0; we obtain uq(qH ;H) = c; and thus qdH = q

H : Similarly, 3 = 1 = 0 yields 4 < 0 in
(34), which is a contradiction. Also, (33) and (35) with 3 = 0; we obtain uq(qL; L) = c; and thus
qdL = q

L:
By Claim 5 and 6, we can conne our attention to the ve cases below. Case I, in which 1 = 0;
2 > 0; 3 > 0 and 4 = 0 ((9) and (10) are binding), Case II, in which 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0 and
4 = 0 ((6); (9) and (10) are binding), Case III, in which 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 = 0 and 4 = 0 ((6)
and (9) are binding); Case IV, in which 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0 ((6); (9) and (11) are
binding); and Case V, in which 1 > 0; 2 = 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0 ((6) and (11) are binding). We
show that Case I and II belong to the regime of  < , Case III to the regime of  2 [; ); and
Case IV and V to the regime of  > : We denote
qL by uq(qL; L) = c+
'H
'L
uq (qL);(40)
qL by u(qL) =

1   ;(41)
qH by u(qH) =

1   ; and(42)
qH by uq(qH ;H) = c  'L
'H
uq (qH):(43)
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Case I: 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0 and 4 = 0: Suppose  is close to zero. Then, the problem
becomes a standard screening problem in which only (10) and (9) are binding. From (32) and (34)
with 4 = 0, we have uq(qH ;H) = c; and thus qdH = q
m
H (= q

H): To nd q
d
L; we insert 2 = 'H+'L
into (35). We have:
uq(qL; L) = c+
'H
'L
uq (qL);
which implies qdL = qL < q
m
L : Accordingly, p
d
H = u(q

H ;H)  u(qL) > pmH and pdL = u(qL; L) < pmL :
The non-binding constraint associated with 1 is written as:
u(qL)  
1   > 0:
As  increases, the constraint will eventually be binding at  = ; where  = (1  )u(qL):
Case II: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0 and 4 = 0: As  becomes ; the constraint linked to 1; (6);
begins to bind as well. In this case, the binding (36), (37), and (38) give:
u(qL) =

1   ;
which implies qdL = qL Q qFL ; depending on the size of : From (32) and (34) with 4 = 0; we
have qdH = q
m
H (= q

H): From the binding constraints, we have p
d
H = u(q

H ;H)   1  R pmH and
pdL = u(qL; L) Q pmL : Case II is now valid when  2 [; ); where  = (1  )u(qL): If  becomes
greater than , the constraint linked to 3; (10); becomes no longer binding.
Case III: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 = 0 and 4 = 0: Only (6) and (9) are binding in this sub-regime.
As in the above two cases, 4 = 0 implies that qdH = q

H : From (33) and (35) with 3 = 0 we
have qdL = q

L: From the binding constraints, we have p
d
H = u(q

H ;H)   1 

= pH   1 

and
pdL = u(q

L; L) = p

L: The non-binding constraint related with 4; (11); is written as:
u(qH) >

1   :
As  becomes larger, this constraint will bind at  = ; where  = (1  )u(qH):
Case IV: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0: As  > ; we consider the case where the
constraint linked to 4; (11); begins to bind. Note that qdH is no longer q

H because of 4 > 0:
Binding (36), (37), and (39) give:
u(qH) =

(1  ) ;
which implies qdH = qH > q

H : As in Case III, 3 = 0 implies that q
d
L = q

L: From the binding
constraints, pdH = u(qH ;H)   1  (< pmH) and pdL = u(qL;H)   1  (< pmL ) : As  increases, pdL
decreases and eventually the constraint linked to 2 becomes no longer binding at  = ; where 
= (1  )u(qH):
Case V: 1 > 0; 2 = 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0: Solving (32) and (33) together with 2 = 3 = 0,
we obtain 1 = 'H + 'L and 4 = 'L. Thus, (34) is rewritten as:
uq(qH ;H) = c  'L
'H
uq (qH);
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which implies qdH = qH > q
m
H = q

H : As in Case III and IV, 3 = 0 implies that q
d
L = q

L: From
the binding constraints, we have pdH = u(qH ;H)  1  (< pmH) and pdL = u(qL; L)  uq (qH)  1 
(< pmL ) :
It follows that Case I and II belong to the regime of  < , Case III to the regime of  2 [; );
and Case IV and V to the regime of  > : 
Proof of Proposition 3.
By Proposition 1, the sellers expected prot with 	 = m is:
m = 'H

u(qH ;H)  cqH   u(qmL )

+ 'L [u(q
m
L ; L)  cqmL ]  :
Also, by Proposition 2, the sellers expected prot with 	 = C is:
d =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
'H
h
u(qH ;H)  cqH   u(qL)
i
+ 'L
h
u(qL; L)  cqL
i
for  < ;
'H
h
u(qH ;H)  cqH   1 
i
+ 'L

u(qL; L)  cqL

for  2 [; );
'H
h
u(qH ;H)  cqH   1 
i
+ 'L [u(q

L; L)  cqL] for  2 [; ];
'H
h
u(qH ;H)  cqH   1 
i
+ 'L
h
u(qL; L)  cqL   1 
i
for  2 (; ];
'H
h
u(qH ;H)  cqH   1 
i
+ 'L
h
u(qL; L)  cqL   uq (qH)  1 
i
for  > :
Claim 10 C is non-increasing and weakly concave in .
Proof. Applying the envelope theorem to the Lagrangian, we have @
C
@ =  1()1   0: Now,
we need to show
sign

@2C
@2

= sign

 @1()
@

 0:
Let us nd 1(). From (32), 1 = 'H   3 + 4: Solving (33) and (35), we obtain 3 =
'L
uq(qL;L) c
uq (qL)
: Similarly, solving (32) and (34), we obtain 4 = max
n
'H
c uq(qH ;H)
uq (qH)
; 0
o
: As a
result,
1() = 'H   'L
uq(qL; L)  c
uq (qL)
+ max

'H
c  uq(qH ;H)
uq (qH)
; 0

:
It is immediate that @1()@ = 0 when  < ;  2 [; ]; and  > ; because qH ; qH ; qL; and qL
is independent of . In other words, in these three regimes, C is linearly decreasing. However,
when  2 [; ) or  2 (; ]; we have to investigate the sign of @1()@ : First, when  2 [; );
1() =  'L uq(qL;L) cuq (qL) : Thus, a simple calculation gives
@1()
@
=  'L

uqq(qL; L)u

q (qL)  uqq(qL)(uq(qL; L)  c)

uq (qL)
2
@qL
@
> 0:
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The terms in the bracket are negative under uqq(q;L)uq(q;L) 
uqq(q;H)
uq(q;H)
: By applying the implicit function
theorem to u(qL) = 1  , we have
@qL
@ =
1
(1 )uq (qL) > 0: Likewise, it can be easily checked that
for  2 (; ]; 1() = 'H c uq(qH ;H)uq (qH) is decreasing in .
m is linearly decreasing, while d is concavely decreasing in : Also, note that m( = 0) >
d( = 0); while m( = ) > d( = ): Thus, if we nd any  such that m() < d(); there
should exist l and h so that m()  d() for   l and   h; but m() < d() for
 2 (l; h): Next, consider   (1  )u(qL): Then, we have:
d ( = ) m ( = ) = (1  )u(qL) + 'L [u(qL; L)  cqL]
  'H

u(qL)  u(qmL )
  'L u(qFL ; L)  cqmL 
The rst two terms are positive, whereas the last two terms are negative. Given L, as H increases
(hence  increases), both u(qL) and u
(qFL ) increase. On the other hand, u(q
m
L ; L)  cqmL become
smaller due to a greater downward distortion in qmL . Therefore:
lim
H!1
d ( = ) m ( = ) > 0;
which implies that m() < d() for  2 (l; h), where l <  < h: 
Proof of Proposition 4.
With the possibility of sharing the transaction e¤ort with the consumer, the participation constraints
and incentive constraints are written accordingly as:
(44) u(qH ;H)  pH   (1  em)  0;
(45) [em + (1  em)] [u(qL; L)  pL]  0:
u(qH ;H)  pH   (1  em)(46)
 max
(
u(qL;H)  pL   (1  em);
[em + (1  em)] [u(qL;H)  pL]
)
;
[em + (1  em)] [u(qL; L)  pL](47)
 max
(
u(qH ; L)  pH   (1  em);
[em + (1  em)] [u(qH ; L)  pH ]
)
:
Thus, the seller solves the following problem:
Max
q;p;e
s = 'H (pH   cqH) + 'L(em) [pL   cqL]  em;
subject to (15); (16); (44); (45); (46) and (47):
27
The structure of the problem is the same as the sellers problem with 	 = d where the type-H
consumer exerts an e¤ort of e = 1 (Proof of Proposition 2). As in Proof of Proposition 2, there are
multiple cases here, depending on the parameters. We focus on the case where  is large enough
that (15) and (45) are the binding constraints, instead of (46) and (45)  Case III in Proof of
Proposition 2. We will rst obtain the solution within this regime with only (15) and (45) to show
that these constraints are in fact binding. Then, we characterize the cuto¤ value of  for this
regime. It can be easily shown that the other constraints are satised in this regime. With (15)
and (45); the Lagrangian of the sellers problem can be written as:
L = 'H (pH   cqH) + [em + (1  em)]'L (pL   cqL)  em
+ 1 fu(qH ;H)  pH   (1  em)  [em + (1  em)] [u(qH ;H)  pH ]g
+ 2 f[em + (1  em)] [u(qL; L)  pL]g
The rst order conditions are:
(48)
@L
@pH
= 'H   1 f1  [em + (1  em)]g = 0;
(49)
@L
@pL
= [em + (1  em)] ('L   2) = 0;
@L
@em
= (1  )'L (pL   cqL)  (50)
+ 1 f  (1  ) [u(qH ;H)  pH ]g+ 2(1  ) [u(qL; L)  pL]  0:
Notice rst that, if em = 1; then we have a contradiction in (48)  with the marketing strategy
(only the seller exerts the transaction e¤ort), as shown in Proposition 1, (15) becomes irrelevant
since no e¤ort from the consumer needs to be induced. That is,  is large enough that @L=@em
cannot be strictly positive in this regime, and em < 1: Then, em + (1  em) 2 (0; 1); and it is
implied from (48) that 1 > 0: Therefore, (15) is binding and:
(51) u(qH ;H)  pH   (1  em) = [em + (1  em)] [u(qH ;H)  pH ] :
If em = 1; then this, after a simple manipulation, becomes:
(52) u(qH ;H)  pH = 
1   :
Also, from (49); 2 = 'L > 0; and therefore (45) is binding and:
(53) u(qL; L)  pL = 0:
Replacing pH and pL with their values in the objective function and optimizing in qH and qL, we
have:
uq(q
s
H ;H) = c and uq(q
s
L; L) = c;
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implying that qsH = q

H and q
s
L = q

L: Using (52) and (53); we can replace the consumer surplus
with their values in (50): We then have:
(54) u(qsL; L)  cqsL 

'L(1  )
:
Again, in this regime,  is large enough that the week inequality in (54) holds. Therefore, if 'L is
small enough, the inequality in (54) is strictly satised and em = 0:
When em = 0 ('L is small enough), the optimal outcome is exactly the same as the one in Case
III in Proof of Proposition 2, and so is the cuto¤ , i.e., the outcome here is optimal for  2 [; ];
where  = (1 )u(qL) and  = (1 )u(qH): Showing that demarketing is optimal is the same
as in Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
First, (8) is implied by (17) and (9):
u(qH ;H)  pH   s   [u(qL;H)  pL]
  [u(qL; L)  pL]  0:
Thus, (8) is not binding. Next we show that (18) is non-binding. After rearranging (17); we
have:   u(qH ;H)   pH    (u(qL;H)  pL) : Similarly, (18) is written as   u(qH ; L)   pH  
 [u(qL; L)  pL] : These two inequalities imply that the latter is always satised because u(qH) >
u(qL) regardless of (17): Since (8) and (18) are non-binding, the Lagrangian of the sellers problem
can be written as:
L = 'H (pH   cqH) + 'L (pL   cqL)
+ 1 [u(qH ;H)  pH      (u(qL;H)  pL)]
+ 2[u(qL; L)  pL]
+ 3 [u(qH ;H)  pH   u(qL;H) + pL]
The rst order conditions are:
(55)
@L
@pH
= 'H   1   3 = 0;
(56)
@L
@pL
= 'L + 1   2 + 3 = 0;
(57)
@L
@qH
=  'Hc+ (1 + 3)uq(qH ;H) = 0;
(58)
@L
@qL
=  'Lc+ 2uq(qL; L)  (1 + 3)uq(qL;H) = 0;
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(59)
@L
@1
= u(qH ;H)  pH      (u(qL;H)  pL)  0; 1
@L
@1
= 0;
(60)
@L
@2
= u(qL; L)  pL  0; 2
@L
@2
= 0;
(61)
@L
@3
= u(qH ;H)  pH   u(qL;H) + pL  0; 3
@L
@3
= 0;
As will be shown below, the rst regime,  < e; is divided into two sub-regimes:  <  and
 2 [; e):
Case I: 1 = 0; 2 > 0; and 3 > 0: Suppose  is small enough. Then, the problem is reduced to
a standard problem. We obtain eqdH = qH and eqdL = qL as in Case I in the full menu case. The
non-binding constraint associated with 1 is written as:
u(qL)  
(1  ) > 0:
Accordingly, epdH = u(qH ;H)   u(qL) > pmH and epdL = u(qL; L) < pmL : As  becomes large, the
constraint will be binding at  = ; where   (1  )u(qL):
Case II: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; and 3 > 0: As  becomes , the three constraints, (59), (60), and (61),
simultaneously bind. Thus, in this case, eqdH = qH ; and eqdL is characterized as:
u(eqdL) = (1  ) :
This case is valid when  2 [; e); where e = (1   )u(qFL ) and  is dened in the Proof of
Proposition 2. From the binding constraints, we have epdH = u(qH ;H)   u(qL)    and epdL =
u(eqdL; L): If  becomes larger than e; then (10) becomes no longer binding.
Case III: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; and 3 = 0: Next, when  > e; only (17) and (9) are binding. Substituting
(17) and (9) into the sellers objective function, we obtain
'H
 
u(qH ;H)    u(qL)  cqH

+ 'L (u(qL; L)  cqL) :
The rst order conditions give eqdH = qH and eqdL = qFL . Note that  does not a¤ect the choice
of eqdL; which is characterized by uq(eqdL; L) = c + 'H'L uq (eqdL): From the binding constraints, epdH =
u(qH ;H)  u(qmL )   and epdL = u(qmL ; L):
Proof of Proposition 6.
By proposition 4, the sellers expected prot with 	 = ed is:
ed =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
'H
h
u(qH ;H)  cqH   u(qL)
i
+ 'L
h
u(qL; L)  cqL
i
for  < ;
'H
h
u(qH ;H)  cqH   1 
i
+ 'L

u(qL; L)  cqL

for  2 [; e);
'H

u(qH ;H)  cqH   u(qmL )  

+ 'L [u(q
m
L ; L)  cqmL ] for   e:
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Like d(); it can be shown that ed() is non-increasing and weakly concave in : It is clear that
d() = ed() for   e:
Note that ed() is decreasing in  more slowly than d() and m() for  > ; where 
is dened in Denition 1. Thus, if we nd ed() < d() at a certain ; then there must existeh < h such that ed() > maxfd();m()g for  > eh: Below we provide a su¢ cient condition
for it. We compare ed() and d() at  =  to nd:
ed( = ) d( = ) < 0, 'H
'L
<
[(u(qL; L)  cqL)  (u(qmL ; L)  cqmL )]
u(qL)  u(qFL )
 :
Thus, the sellers choice of 	 = ed generates a higher prot when  is su¢ ciently large. 
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Figure 1 Game Tree of the Illustrative Example
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Figure 2 Marketing, Demarketing and Exclusive Channel
0Marketing strategy for
a higher chance of
selling the product
Demarketing strategy for
price discrimination
by extracting information rent
Demarketing strategy with
exclusive channel for
price discrimination
by saving the effort cost
Small Effort Cost Intermediate Effort Cost Large Effort Cost
a
Figure 3 The E¤ort Cost and the Sellers Optimal Strategy
